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 Counsel for Appellees 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs Richard Alexander, Abigail Bacon, George 
Davidson, Jeannine DeVries, Lisa Geary, Yvonne Wheeler, 
and Arcadia Lee rented cars from Payless Car Rental, Inc., a 
subsidiary of Avis Budget Group, Inc.  Plaintiffs, on behalf of 
a putative class, sued Defendants Payless and Avis for 
unauthorized charges.  Defendants moved to compel Plaintiffs 
to arbitrate their claims.  Because the District Court correctly 
denied their motions, we will affirm. 
I 
A 
 Plaintiffs rented cars in 2016.  Six plaintiffs rented cars 
in the United States (“U.S. Plaintiffs”), and one rented a car in 
Costa Rica.  At the Payless rental counter, the U.S. Plaintiffs 
each signed identical one-page rental agreements (“U.S. 
Agreement”), which, among other things, itemized charges and 
fees and showed whether the customer had accepted or 
declined certain products and services.  Each U.S. Plaintiff 
affixed his or her signature below the final paragraph, which 
provides: “I agree the charges listed above are estimates and 
that I have reviewed&agreed to all notices&terms here and in 
the rental jacket.”  J.A. 631, 685, 720, 784, 842, 875.   
 
After the U.S. Plaintiffs signed their agreements, the 
rental associate folded the agreement into thirds, placed it into 
what Defendants call a “rental jacket,” and handed the jacket 
to the U.S. Plaintiffs.  The rental jacket bears the title “Rental 
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Terms and Conditions” at the top of the front page, not the title 
“rental jacket,” and contains thirty-one paragraphs.  J.A. 220, 
225.  The word “jacket” appears in only the second paragraph, 
in the phrase “Rental Document Jacket.”  J.A. 220, 225.  The 
twenty-eighth paragraph contains an arbitration provision, 
which provides that “all disputes . . . arising out of, relating to 
or in connection with [the] rental of a vehicle from Payless . . . 
shall be exclusively settled through binding arbitration.”  J.A. 
223, 228 (emphasis omitted).   
 
 The rental jackets were kept at the rental counter, 
typically near the rental associate’s computer terminal or 
printer.  Payless rental associates are trained to give a rental 
jacket to each customer after the customer signs the U.S. 
Agreement and to any customer who requests one, but the 
associates are not trained to alert customers to the additional 
terms in the rental jacket.  The rental associates said nothing 
about the rental jacket when the U.S. Plaintiffs reviewed their 
agreements.     
 
 Lee rented a car in Costa Rica from a licensee of 
Payless.  The licensee uses a two-sided single page document 
for its rentals (“Costa Rica Agreement”).  The front side 
contains the details of the transaction.  The back side is titled 
“Rental Agreement” and includes pre-printed terms in English 
and Spanish.  J.A. 204.  The back side also includes a “Dispute 
resolution” clause, which requires that disputes related to the 
agreement be arbitrated.  J.A. 204.  
 
The front and back sides both have signature lines.  On 
the front side, just before the signature line, the Costa Rica 
Agreement states: “By signing below, you agree to the terms 
and conditions of this Agreement, and you acknowledge that 
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you have been given an opportunity to read this Agreement 
before being asked to sign.”  J.A. 203.  The back side has a 
separate signature line at the bottom-right corner, preceded by 
the statement in English and Spanish: “By signing below, you 
agree to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.”  J.A. 204.  
Lee signed the front side of the Costa Rica Agreement but did 
not sign the back side.  A video of Lee’s rental transaction 
shows the rental associate instructing Lee to initial and sign on 
the front side of the Costa Rica Agreement but does not show 
the associate informing Lee about the back side.  In addition, 
the video does not show that Lee turned the document over.    
     
Five of the U.S. Plaintiffs used websites—
Expedia.com, Hotwire.com, or Priceline.com—to reserve their 
Payless car rentals.  Each of the websites’ terms of use included 
an arbitration provision.    
 
B 
Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against 
Defendants, alleging violations of the New Jersey Consumer 
Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 et seq., the Florida 
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201 
et seq., the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 598.0903 et seq., the Nevada Statutory Consumer Fraud 
Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.600 et seq., and for common law 
unjust enrichment and conversion.  Plaintiffs allege that 
Defendants charged them for products and services that they 
either had not authorized or had declined.     
 
In response, Defendants moved to compel arbitration 
and to dismiss or stay the action pending arbitration pursuant 
to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  The District Court 
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denied the motions and directed the parties to engage in 
discovery on arbitrability.  It said that it would “accept one 
joint motion from [D]efendants for partial summary judgment 
on the motion to compel arbitration,” and that Plaintiffs could 
then cross-move for summary judgment on arbitrability.  
Bacon v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., Civ. No. 16-5939 (KM) 
(JBC), 2017 WL 2525009, at *16 (D.N.J. June 9, 2017) 
(emphasis omitted).  Following targeted discovery, Defendants 
filed a new joint motion, styled as a “Motion for Summary 
Judgment to Compel Arbitration.”  ECF No. 81 at 1.  In that 
motion, they “renew[ed] their request that [the] Court enforce 
the arbitration provisions in Plaintiffs’ rental contracts and 
compel bilateral arbitration . . . consistent with the” FAA.  ECF 
No. 81-1 at 8.  Plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment 
on the arbitration issue, arguing that the undisputed facts 
showed that they had never agreed to arbitrate.   
 
 The District Court denied Defendants’ motion and 
granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion.  Bacon v. Avis Budget Grp., 
Inc., 357 F. Supp. 3d 401, 432 (D.N.J. 2018).  As to the U.S. 
Agreements, the Court denied Defendants’ motion and granted 
Plaintiffs’ motion on the ground that the undisputed facts 
showed that the U.S. Plaintiffs did not assent to the arbitration 
provision.  Id. at 418-26.  As to the Costa Rica Agreement, the 
Court denied both parties’ motions because a disputed factual 
issue existed as to whether Lee was on reasonable notice of the 
arbitration provision.  Id. at 426-29.  As to the motions based 
on the website terms, the Court held that the record was not 
sufficiently developed concerning assent and that the issue 
could be resolved after further discovery either via summary 
judgment or at trial.  Id. at 429-32.  Defendants appeal.  
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II1 
Before turning to the merits of this appeal, we must 
determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction.  The order 
here addressed three items: (1) the request to compel the U.S. 
Plaintiffs to arbitrate their dispute; (2) the request to compel 
Lee to arbitrate her dispute; and (3) the request to compel 
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses in the websites 
Plaintiffs used to make their reservations.  The parties agree, 
correctly, that we have appellate jurisdiction over the order 
denying the request to compel the U.S. Plaintiffs to arbitrate.  
9 U.S.C. § 16.  The parties disagree, however, about whether 
we have jurisdiction over the other two aspects of the order.  
For the reasons set forth below, we have jurisdiction over those 
items, too.    
 
Generally, the Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over 
only the “final decisions” of district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
which are decisions that “end[] the litigation on the merits and 
leave[] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,” 
Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 236 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).  
The FAA sets forth an exception to the final decision rule in 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, providing that an “appeal may be taken from 
. . . an order . . . refusing a stay of any action under [§] 3 of” 
the FAA, “denying a petition under [§] 4 of [the FAA] to order 
arbitration to proceed,” or “denying an application under 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2)(A).     
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[§] 206 of [the FAA] to compel arbitration.”  9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(1)(A)-(C).   
 
Thus, whether § 16(a) gives us jurisdiction over the 
District Court’s order hinges on whether the order involves a 
§ 3 motion for a stay or a § 4 or § 206 petition or motion to 
compel arbitration.2  9 U.S.C. § 16.  As a result, we first 
 
2 While Defendants relied on only 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4 
in their motions, they initially sought to compel arbitration of 
the Costa Rica Agreement in Costa Rica, so to the extent the 
Costa Rica Agreement can be read as requiring arbitration to 
take place in Costa Rica, the District Court’s authority to 
compel arbitration as to that agreement would derive from 9 
U.S.C. § 206.  See Control Screening LLC v. Tech. 
Application & Prod. Co. (Tecapro), 687 F.3d 163, 171 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (“A district court’s primary authority to compel 
arbitration in the international context comes from 9 U.S.C. 
§ 206, rather than from 9 U.S.C. § 4.”).  Thus, we construe the 
Court’s order as resolving the arbitration demand involving the 
U.S. Plaintiffs under § 4 and the demand involving the Costa 
Rica Agreement under § 206.  In any event, “[u]nder § 208, the 
requirements of § 4 apply to § 206 applications as well, 
provided there is no conflict between the two provisions.” 
Devon Robotics, LLC v. DeViedma, 798 F.3d 136, 144 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  While § 4 “accrues only when the respondent 
unequivocally refuses to arbitrate,” Control Screening LLC, 
687 F.3d at 171 n.6 (quoting PaineWebber Inc. v. Faragalli, 61 
F.3d 1063, 1066 (3d Cir. 1995)), and this requirement has 
never been applied to § 206, this distinction has no impact here 
because all Plaintiffs unequivocally refused to arbitrate by 
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examine whether the order denied a motion to compel 
arbitration (as opposed to a ruling beyond compelling 
arbitration, such as an adjudication on the merits of the 
dispute).  Devon Robotics, LLC v. DeViedma, 798 F.3d 136, 
146-47 (3d Cir. 2015).  If we conclude that the order denied a 
motion to compel arbitration, then we will exercise jurisdiction 
even if that order is not final.  Sandvik A.B. v. Advent Int’l 
Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 102-03 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
To determine whether a district court was presented 
with a motion to compel arbitration, we examine (1) “the 
caption and relief requested in the underlying motion” and 
(2) “the label and the operative terms of the district court’s 
order.”  Devon, 798 F.3d at 146-47.  “[L]ook[ing] beyond the 
caption itself . . . ensure[s] that a true motion to compel is not 
overlooked and . . . that parties cannot game the captions of 
their motions in an effort to gain an interlocutory appeal where 
none is warranted.”  Id. at 146 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).3   
 
filing their class-action complaint.  See PaineWebber Inc., 61 
F.3d at 1068. 
3 In Devon, we declined to extend § 16 to all motions 
for summary judgment, explaining that the FAA “provides no 
support for exercising jurisdiction over an order denying a 
motion for summary judgment,” and “Congress’s enumeration 
of several categories of appealable orders, but not orders 
denying summary judgment, indicates that Congress intended 
orders denying summary judgment to fall outside the scope of 
§ 16.”  798 F.3d at 142-43.  Thus, we must take care not to 
blindly equate a denial of summary judgment with a denial of 
a motion to compel under § 16 because “a party trying to 
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Here, the events leading to the filing of the motion, its 
title, and the substance of the District Court’s order all show 
that the motion sought an order compelling arbitration, which 
is appealable under § 16(a).  First, the procedural history of this 
case shows that Defendants did not “game the caption[] of their 
motion[] in an effort to gain an interlocutory appeal where none 
is warranted.”  Id.  Defendants first moved to compel 
arbitration and dismiss the complaint or stay the action pending 
arbitration under the FAA.  The District Court denied the 
motions, directed the parties to engage in discovery on 
arbitrability, and instructed that they could then file renewed 
motions, to be decided under a summary judgment standard.  
After discovery, Defendants filed a “Motion for Summary 
Judgment to Compel Arbitration.”  ECF No. 81 at 1.  This label 
reflected compliance with the Court’s directive to file a joint 
motion for summary judgment.  Furthermore, in their summary 
judgment brief, Defendants stated: “Defendants renew their 
request that this Court enforce the arbitration provisions in 
Plaintiffs’ rental contracts and compel bilateral arbitration,” 
under the FAA and “the United States Supreme Court’s 
mandate that arbitration agreements be strictly enforced.”  ECF 
No. 81-1 at 8.  Thus, the relief sought was to compel 
arbitration.4   
 
enforce an arbitration agreement but seeking to avoid trial on 
the issue of arbitrability could file a motion for summary 
judgment instead of a § 4 petition . . . and then seek immediate 
review if the motion is denied.”  Id. at 144.   
4 The motion also mirrored the procedural requirements 
of § 4.  Under § 4, a party’s ability to petition for an order 
directing arbitration to proceed is premised on the opposing 
party’s “alleged failure, neglect, or refusal . . . to arbitrate,” and 
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Second, the District Court acknowledged that 
Defendants sought as relief an order to compel arbitration by 
stating that “[D]efendants’ motion for summary judgment to 
compel arbitration (DE 81) is DENIED as presented.”  Bacon, 
2017 WL 2525009, at *16; see also J.A. 4; cf. Devon, 798 F.3d 
at 147-48 (concluding that motion was not one to compel 
arbitration where order denied summary judgment on the 
merits).  Accordingly, the language and substance of 
Defendants’ motion and the Court’s order show that 
Defendants sought an order compelling arbitration, and the 
Court denied that request.  Because the plain text of § 16(a) 
reaches an order refusing to compel arbitration, we have 
jurisdiction over this order. 
 
 
that the party serve the opposing party with “[f]ive days’ notice 
in writing” of the petition.  § 4.  First, Plaintiffs unequivocally 
refused to arbitrate by filing their class-action complaint.  See 
PaineWebber Inc., 61 F.3d at 1068.  Second, Plaintiffs were on 
notice that Defendants sought arbitration over litigation.  
Defendants moved to compel arbitration—and the District 
Court ordered the parties to engage in targeted discovery on 
arbitrability and to renew their motions—more than one year 
before Defendants filed the instant motions.  See Guidotti, 716 
F.3d at 776 (“After limited discovery, the court may entertain 
a renewed motion to compel arbitration, this time judging the 
motion under a summary judgment standard.”); Kirleis v. 
Dickie, McCamey, & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 158-59 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (analyzing § 4 motion to compel arbitration in 
response to a complaint).  Furthermore, “no one was 
‘prejudicially misled’ in this case by [Defendants’] styling of 
[their] motion as a motion for summary judgment rather than a 
motion to compel.”  Devon, 798 F.3d at 148.      
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To be sure, two aspects of the District Court’s order 
were not final as more work must be done in the District Court.  
First, the Court declined to compel Lee to arbitrate in Costa 
Rica because there was a disputed issue of fact and hence the 
issue of arbitrability will proceed to trial.  Second, the Court 
declined to rule on whether Plaintiffs assented to the websites’ 
arbitration clauses because it needed additional evidence.  That 
latter motion was essentially denied without prejudice subject 
to additional discovery.   
 
Both orders, however, denied motions to compel 
arbitration, and we may exercise appellate jurisdiction over 
them regardless of finality.  See Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 103.  The 
FAA “makes no distinction between orders denying arbitration 
and ‘final orders’ that accomplish the same end.”  Id. at 102.  
We have jurisdiction over orders refusing to compel arbitration 
“irrespective of the fact that the [motion] was denied without 
prejudice,” Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 
F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012), as well as orders entered where 
the “district court does not feel itself ready to make a definitive 
decision on whether to order arbitration and therefore denies a 
motion to compel,” Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 103.  Thus, we may 
exercise appellate jurisdiction over all three issues raised in this 
appeal.   
 
III5 
Having determined that we have appellate jurisdiction, 
we turn to the merits.  The FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, embodies 
 
5 “We exercise plenary review over questions regarding 
the validity and enforceability of an agreement to 
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the “national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration 
agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.”  
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 
(2006).  The FAA requires courts to stay litigation and compel 
arbitration of claims covered by a written, enforceable 
arbitration agreement.  9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4; see also § 206.   
 
Before compelling a party to arbitrate under the FAA, 
we must consider two “gateway” questions, one of which is 
“whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement.”6  
 
arbitrate,” Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 177 
(3d Cir. 2010), and “we may affirm on any grounds supported 
by the record,” MacDonald v. Cashcall, Inc., 883 F.3d 220, 225 
(3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Hassen v. Gov’t of V.I., 861 F.3d 108, 
114 (3d Cir. 2017)).   
When presented with a motion to compel arbitration 
based on an evidentiary record, courts apply the summary 
judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) 
“because the district court’s order . . . is in effect a summary 
disposition of the issue of whether or not there had been a 
meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate.’”  Jaludi v. 
Citigroup, 933 F.3d 246, 251 n.7 (3d Cir. 2019) (omission in 
original) (quoting White v. Sunoco, Inc., 870 F.3d 257, 262 (3d 
Cir. 2017)).  A “district court should only grant a motion to 
compel arbitration ‘if there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and, after viewing facts and drawing inferences in 
favor of the non-moving party, the party moving to compel is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  Id. (quoting White, 
870 F.3d at 262). 
6 The second issue is whether the dispute is covered by 
the arbitration clause.  Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. 1416-17.  This 
issue is not implicated in this appeal.  
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Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019) 
(quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 
(2003) (plurality opinion)).  One component of a valid 
arbitration agreement is that the parties agreed to arbitrate.  To 
determine this, we apply state-law principles of contract 
formation.  First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
944 (1995).  
 
The parties do not dispute that New Jersey law governs 
the question of contract formation for both the U.S. 
Agreements signed by Alexander, Bacon, Davidson, and 
DeVries, and the Costa Rica Agreement signed by Lee, nor do 
they dispute that Florida law governs the question of contract 
formation for the U.S. Agreements signed by Geary and 
Wheeler. 
 
Defendants assert that valid agreements existed and that 
the District Court erred in refusing to compel arbitration based 
on all the agreements.  First, Defendants argue that the rental 
jacket containing the arbitration provision was incorporated 
into the U.S. Agreements under New Jersey and Florida law.  
Second, they contend that Lee signed the Costa Rica 
Agreement and had reasonable notice of the arbitration 
provision on the back side.  Third, Defendants argue that 
Plaintiffs who booked online agreed to each website’s terms of 
use and arbitration provision, and that the Court erred in 
excluding evidence on which Defendants relied concerning 
these websites.  Their arguments fail.   
A 
 The District Court properly held that the rental jackets 
were not adequately incorporated into the U.S. Agreements 
15 
and thus that the U.S. Plaintiffs did not assent to the arbitration 
provision in the rental jackets. 
 
1 
Under New Jersey law, “[a]n enforceable agreement 
requires mutual assent, a meeting of the minds based on a 
common understanding of the contract terms.”  Morgan v. 
Sanford Brown Inst., 137 A.3d 1168, 1180 (N.J. 2016).  New 
Jersey law permits contract terms to be incorporated by 
reference.  “[F]or there to be a proper and enforceable 
incorporation by reference of a separate document,” (1) the 
separate document “must be described in such terms that its 
identity may be ascertained beyond doubt” and (2) “the party 
to be bound by the terms must have had ‘knowledge of and 
assented to the incorporated terms.’”  Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, 
Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 983 A.2d 604, 617 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2009) (quoting 11 Samuel Williston & Richard 
A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 30:25 (4th ed. 
1999)).  
 
The U.S. Agreement does not incorporate the rental 
jacket beyond doubt and thus does not bind Plaintiffs 
Alexander, Bacon, Davidson, and DeVries to the arbitration 
provision contained within the jacket.  First, the U.S. 
Agreement does not describe the rental jacket “in such terms 
that its identity may be ascertained beyond doubt.”  Quinn, 983 
A.2d at 617.  The final paragraph of the U.S. Agreement 
provides that the customer “reviewed&agreed to all 
notices&terms here and in the rental jacket,” J.A. 631, 720, 
784, 842, but the phrase “rental jacket” is not defined or even 
used in the U.S. Agreement and is not otherwise so “specific 
or identifiable” that the customer could ascertain the document 
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to which the phrase refers, Quinn, 983 A.2d at 618 (holding 
that a retainer agreement stating only that the client would be 
bound “by our standard billing practices and firm policies” did 
not incorporate the master retainer because the purportedly 
incorporating agreement provided no way to identify the 
purportedly incorporated agreement, such as by document date 
or publication number).  In fact, the rental jacket itself is 
labeled “Rental Terms and Conditions” rather than “rental 
jacket.”  J.A. 220, 225.  Thus, the U.S. Agreement does not 
sufficiently describe the rental jacket to incorporate it by 
reference. 
 
Second, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs knew about 
the arbitration provision in the rental jacket when they signed 
the U.S. Agreement.  Indeed, “it is without dispute that 
[Plaintiffs] were not shown and did not see [the rental jacket],” 
Quinn, 983 A.2d at 619, until after they had signed the U.S. 
Agreement and that the rental associates did not discuss any 
terms contained in the rental jacket at any time. 
 
While there is no obligation to provide a copy of a 
clearly identified incorporated agreement at the time the 
agreement itself is signed, the incorporated document must be 
identified beyond doubt.  Here, the incorporated agreement is 
not so identified.   Furthermore, Defendants’ contention that 
the rental jacket was readily available to Plaintiffs is belied by 
the undisputed facts.  The rental jackets sat behind the rental 
counter where the associate worked and hence not in an area 
that a reasonable customer would think he had access.  
Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that Plaintiffs were 
directed to the jacket that Defendants assert was incorporated 
into the U.S. Agreement or were on “reasonable notice” of its 
terms when they signed the U.S. Agreement.  Hoffman v. 
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Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC, 18 A.3d 210, 217 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2011) (holding that a party may be bound if it 
has “reasonable notice” of the contract terms (quoting Caspi v. 
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1999))).  “[A] party cannot be required to arbitrate 
without its assent,” James v. Glob. TelLink Corp., 852 F.3d 
262, 268 (3d Cir. 2017), and a party cannot assent to something 
he does not know exists.  Because the U.S. Agreement did not 
describe the rental jacket “in such terms that its identity [could] 
be ascertained beyond doubt” and Plaintiffs did not have 
“knowledge of and assent[] to” the rental jacket terms when 
they signed the U.S. Agreements, Quinn, 983 A.2d at 617, the 
District Court properly held that Plaintiffs whose agreements 




We reach the same conclusion for Plaintiffs subject to 
Florida law.  Under that law, “where a writing expressly refers 
to and sufficiently describes another document, that other 
document . . . is to be interpreted as part of the writing.”  OBS 
Co. v. Pace Constr. Corp., 558 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 1990).  
“Incorporation by reference, however, requires more than 
simply making reference to another document in a contract.”  
Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So. 2d 43, 51 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005).  Instead, “[t]o incorporate by reference a collateral 
document, the incorporating document must (1) specifically 
provide that it is subject to the incorporated collateral 
document and (2) the collateral document to be incorporated 
must be ‘sufficiently described or referred to in the 
incorporating agreement’ so that the intent of the parties may 
be ascertained.”  BGT Grp., Inc. v. Tradewinds Engine Servs., 
18 
LLC, 62 So. 3d 1192, 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).  
 
Although Florida law applies a more lenient test for 
incorporation than New Jersey law, the rental jacket was 
nonetheless not “sufficiently described” to meet Florida’s 
requirement to be deemed incorporated into the U.S. 
Agreement.  As noted above, the rental jacket is labelled 
“Rental Terms and Conditions” rather than “rental jacket.”  
See BGT Grp., 62 So. 3d at 1194-95 (holding a quote for sale 
of turbine parts did “not sufficiently describe” terms in a 
purportedly incorporated document because the incorporating 
document did not provide a specific description of them or 
attach them to the quote, and thus “it cannot objectively be said 
that [the party] agreed to be bound”).  The U.S. Agreement also 
lacked any description of where the rental jacket could be 
found or what the rental jacket was.  Cf. Avatar Props., Inc. v. 
Greetham, 27 So. 3d 764, 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(holding an agreement incorporated the arbitration clause in 
the home warranty document where the incorporating 
agreement stated that the warranty was available at the 
defendant’s office); Kaye v. Macari Bldg. & Design, Inc., 967 
So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding a 
contract incorporated an arbitration provision where the 
incorporating document listed the incorporated document and 
the document number).  Finally, the rental associate did not 
provide the rental jacket to Plaintiffs before they signed the 
U.S. Agreement, see Spicer v. Tenet Fla. Physician Servs., 
LLC, 149 So. 3d 163, 167-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(holding a document with arbitration clause was not 
incorporated because the incorporating agreement did not 
describe, cite, or name the location of the purportedly 
incorporated document until after plaintiff signed the 
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agreement), nor was it in a location that a customer would view 
as accessible.  Thus, the District Court properly held that 
Plaintiffs subject to Florida law did not objectively agree to be 
bound by the arbitration provision in the rental jacket.7  
  
B 
We next address whether Lee agreed to arbitrate her 
claims based on the Costa Rica Agreement.  Unlike Plaintiffs 
who received rental jackets after they signed the U.S. 
Agreement, Lee received a single-page, two-sided document at 
the outset of the transaction and was asked only to review and 
sign the front side.  The back side had a separate unsigned 
signature line and an arbitration clause.   
 
Under New Jersey law, to be binding, a contract term 
must have “been mutually agreed upon by the parties,” 
Hoffman, 18 A.3d at 216, and each party must have 
“reasonable notice” of the contract term, id. at 217 (quoting 
Caspi, 732 A.2d at 532).   
 
The District Court correctly concluded that a genuine 
dispute exists over whether Lee was on reasonable notice of 
the arbitration provision on the back side of the Costa Rica 
Agreement.  The front side of the Costa Rica Agreement 
contains the following language immediately above the 
 
7 Defendants contend that several district courts have 
held on nearly identical facts that a rental jacket is incorporated 
into a rental car agreement.  These decisions are inapposite, 
however, because they either arise under a different state’s 
contract law or involve agreements that described the jacket 
more specifically than in this case.   
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signature line: “By signing below, you agree to the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement, and you acknowledge that you 
have been given an opportunity to read this Agreement before 
being asked to sign.”  J.A. 203.  This language does not direct 
the customer to the back side or inform him of its terms.  
See Rockel v. Cherry Hill Dodge, 847 A.2d 621, 627 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (declining to compel arbitration 
where the arbitration provision was in small print on the back 
side of a document that only cautioned “in slightly larger print 
on the front, that ‘important arbitration disclosures’ appear on 
the reverse side”).  Construing the facts in a light most 
favorable to Lee, this statement, and the lack of reference to 
the back side, imply that the “Agreement” consists of the text 
only on the front side.  Thus, the evidence does not 
undisputedly show that Lee had “reasonable notice” of the 
arbitration agreement on the back side of the Costa Rica 
Agreement.   
 
Furthermore, as the District Court correctly concluded, 
the parties dispute whether the rental associate showed Lee the 
Costa Rica Agreement in a way that would have revealed that 
there was writing on the back side.  Based on the video, 
Defendants contend that the rental associate “told Lee that he 
would give her a copy of the [Costa Rica Agreement] and then 
showed her the two-sided agreement as he put it into a folder 
and handed it to her.”  J.A. 1374 ¶ 209.  Notably, this would 
have occurred after she signed the front side of the agreement.  
Moreover, the video does not depict the associate presenting 
Lee the back side of the document as he did with the front side, 
nor did she sign the back side.  In fact, the video does not depict 
the associate instructing Lee to sign the back of the document 
as he did with the front side.  Furthermore, Lee asserts that the 
associate did not explain the terms and conditions paragraph of 
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the Costa Rica Agreement, advise her that it contained an 
arbitration provision, or direct her to the back side of the Costa 
Rica Agreement.  Based upon this evidence, a reasonable juror 
might find that Lee acted in reliance on the representations of 
the sales associate, which pointed her only to the terms on the 
front side.   
 
Because there are genuine disputes of fact concerning 
whether Lee had reasonable notice of the back side of the Costa 
Rica Agreement and its arbitration provision, the motion for 
summary judgment to compel arbitration was properly denied. 
 
C 
The District Court also correctly rejected Defendants’ 
assertion that they provided copies of the website screenshots 
that embody the layouts and the terms of the website 
agreements Plaintiffs viewed when they made their rental 
reservations.  Because the Court lacked authenticated evidence 
that would establish Plaintiffs’ assent to the terms in the 
screenshots Defendants offered, it correctly declined to decide 
whether the websites bound Plaintiffs to arbitrate.8     
 
8 Plaintiffs argue that Defendants waived the 
opportunity to compel arbitration based on the websites’ terms 
because they did not include this ground in their initial motions 
to compel arbitration.  We will not enforce the waiver here.  
Defendants relied on the website terms in their motion for 
summary judgment and Plaintiffs did not present the waiver 
argument in their opposition to Defendants’ joint motion for 
summary judgment to compel arbitration.  As a result, they 
have waived any waiver argument on appeal.  See Freeman v. 
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Facts supporting summary judgment must be capable of 
being “presented in a form that would be admissible in 
evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).  “We review a district 
court’s determinations concerning the admissibility of 
evidence for an abuse of discretion.”  Blunt v. Lower Merion 
Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).   
 
Authenticating evidence under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 901 may be satisfied by testimony of a witness with 
personal knowledge “that an item is what it is claimed to be.”  
Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1); United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 
667 (3d Cir. 2011).  Defendants offered the Certification of 
Matthew Enderle, Avis Online Travel Account Manager, to 
authenticate website screenshots.  His certification provides 
that he is “generally familiar with the terms and conditions on 
Expedia.com, Hotwire.com, and Priceline.com, which [he] 
review[s] and reference[s] from time to time as part of [his] 
job, including during the spring and summer of 2016.”  J.A. 
232.  Attached to the certification are screenshots of the 
process for booking a rental through Expedia.com, 
Hotwire.com, and Priceline.com, taken in December 2017.  
Thus, the 2017 screenshots Enderle presented captured images 
of websites as they existed not in 2016, when Plaintiffs made 
their reservations, but rather as they were some eighteen 
months later.    
 
 
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 
2013) (holding that defendant waived its waiver argument on 
appeal where it never presented the argument to the district 
court).  Accordingly, the District Court correctly considered 
whether those Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate when booking on 
the websites. 
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As the District Court correctly observed, Enderle did 
not have “direct knowledge” about how the websites appeared 
when Plaintiffs accessed them in 2016.  His lack of direct 
knowledge is no surprise.  Enderle is an Avis employee, and 
he provided only his views about websites that “were created 
and maintained” by companies other than Avis without 
explaining how he had personal knowledge that the website 
screen shots he presented were accurate depictions of the 
websites Plaintiff saw.  See Thompson v. Bank of Am. Nat’l 
Ass’n, 783 F.3d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding at 
summary judgment that witness affidavits did not authenticate 
an online log because the affidavits did not “say that [the 
witnesses] have personal knowledge of the online log or that it 
represents an unaltered version of the website . . . likely 
because . . . th[e] log[] w[as] created and maintained by” a third 
party rather than by the witnesses).  Because Enderle’s 
affidavit lacked the personal knowledge required for affidavits 
“used to support or oppose a [summary judgment] motion,” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4), and he did not present the screenshots 
that Plaintiffs accessed in 2016 or state that the screenshots he 
produced were accurate copies of the websites as they existed 
on the date Plaintiffs made their on-line reservations, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this 
evidence.    
 
Because Defendants failed to produce admissible 
evidence concerning the layouts or contents of the websites 
Plaintiffs accessed, the District Court had no basis to determine 
whether Plaintiffs had assented to the websites’ terms.  
See James, 852 F.3d at 267 (acknowledging that whether 
online terms are enforceable “often turn[s] on whether the 
terms or a hyperlink to the terms are reasonably conspicuous 
on the webpage” and where “terms are linked in obscure 
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sections of a webpage . . . courts have refused to find 
constructive notice”).  “[T]he language of the FAA 
affirmatively requires the court to be ‘satisfied’ that the 
arbitration agreement’s existence is not at issue,” Sandvik, 
220 F.3d at 109, and the record at this stage does not provide a 
basis to be so satisfied regarding the websites’ arbitration 
clauses.  As a result, the District Court had good grounds for 
refusing to order arbitration on the evidentiary record it had.9    
 
III 
 For these reasons, we will affirm.   
 
9 We will not consider Plaintiffs’ argument that the 
District Court erred in permitting Defendants to conduct 
additional discovery about online assent.  Plaintiffs’ argument 
seeks to attack a judicial decree “with a view either to enlarging 
his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his 
adversary.”  Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793, 798 (2015) 
(citation omitted).  Such an attack can only be pursued in a 
cross appeal.  Moreover, while Plaintiffs attempted to cross-
appeal this order, Appellate No. 19-1065, the cross-appeal was 
properly dismissed because it was predicated on a non-
appealable interlocutory discovery order.  See Cipollone v. 
Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1116 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“Discovery orders, being interlocutory, are not normally 
appealable.”).  Thus, for these reasons, Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to review of the discovery order as part of this appeal.    
